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We present an overlapping generations model with spatial separation 
and agents who face unsystematic liquidity risk. In a pure exchange 
economy,  agents  engage  in  life  cycle  portfolio  rebalancing.  In  an 
intermediated  economy,  intergenerational  banks  or  mutual  funds 
cater to diversified clienteles so as to avoid rebalancing transactions. 
In equilibrium, these intermediaries pay redemptions with portfolio 
income and never sell secondary assets. We also find that the pure 
exchange  economy  has  a  downward  sloping  yield  curve  and  is 
inherently cyclical. 
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1. Introduction 
The incumbent explanations for the existence of financial intermediaries are that they 
(i)  provide  liquidity  risk  sharing,  (ii)  solve  inefficiencies  due  to  asymmetric 
information, and (iii) align incentives through active monitoring. A rich literature on 
each of the above theories exist.
1 On a fourth generally accepted raison d´être for 
financial intermediation, (iv) scale economies in transactions and logistics, a formal 
model is conspicuously absent. 
In this paper, we use a three period overlapping model in which agents may need to 
consume before a long term production technology pays a riskless dividend. To share 
liquidity  risk,  agents  trade  secondary  claims  for  consumption  goods  in  a  pure 
exchange  market  or  open  accounts  with  financial  institutions  in  an  intermediated 
economy. Our basic framework is thus the same as the OLG Diamond Dybvig (1983) 
model employed by Qi (1994), Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996), and Fulghieri and 
Rovelli (1998), who all investigate the relative merits of financial intermediaries and 
markets  in  sharing  liquidity  risk.
2  The  distinguishing  feature  of  our  model  is  the 
existence of transaction costs, which we model as dead weight shoe leather costs that 
are incurred whenever agents interact. 
We find that in the pure exchange economy, a centrally located market opens where 
early  consumers  sell  secondary  claims  to  newborns  and  late  consumers.  In 
equilibrium, newborns invest their endowment in a mix of short term and long term 
claims, and sell these claims when they have unexpected consumption needs. Agents 
without consumption needs also trade, because they need to reinvest the dividends 
from  their  maturing  assets.  Hence,  in  equilibrium,  early  consumers  travel  to  the 
market twice while late consumers travel three times. 
                                                 
1  The  seminal  paper  addressing  the  liquidity  insurance  argument  is  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983). 
Banks´ circumvention of information asymmetries was conjectured by Leland and Pyle (1977), and 
modelled  by  Boyd  and  Prescott  (1986)  and  Broecker  (1990),  among  others.  Diamond  (1984) 
demonstrates how delegating loan monitoring to financial institutions can be economical. See Freixas 
and Rochet (1997) for a comprehensive review of the banking literature. 
2 In single generation models, the papers by Diamond Dybvig (1983), Jacklin (1987), Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya  (1988),  Hellwig  (1994),  Alonso  (1996),  Samartín  (2001),  Diamond  (1997)  and  von 
Thadden (1998) among others, analyze the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by banks and 
markets. For a review of this literature, see Dwyer and Samartín (2008).   3 
As  an  alternative  to  the  exchange  mechanism,  a  centrally  located  financial 
intermediary may open. In following with the literature, we will denote this institution 
a bank, even though open end mutual funds and insurance companies take on similar 
roles in centralizing liquidity and reducing transaction costs. Agents open deposits 
with the bank and the bank invests in the technology, so that agents undertake only 
two trips: one to deposit, and one to withdraw. Because the depositor clientele of the 
bank  is  diversified  and stationary,  no  costly  rebalancing  transactions  are  required, 
making the intermediated economy superior to the pure exchange economy. 
Apart from the reduced number of transactions, our analysis uncovers an additional 
advantage of intermediated economies relative to exchange economies. We show that 
while the latter are inherently cyclical, the former achieve non cyclical allocations.
3 
We find that for small transaction costs, the exchange economy with a starting date 
cannot escape from a severe cyclical pattern, and that intergenerational welfare can be 
improved upon if transaction costs are introduced, because it dampens cyclicality. We 
also  find  that  the  starting  up  phase  of  an  intermediated  economy  is  significantly 
shorter than the time to stationarity in an exchange economy. 
Benston  and  Smith  (1976)  argue  that  that banks  economize  on  transactions  costs. 
They  interpret  transaction  costs  as  costs  of  transportation,  administration,  search, 
evaluation, and monitoring, among others, and argue that banks enjoy economies of 
scale, scope, and networks in these tasks. In this paper we disregard transaction costs 
due to information asymmetries or moral hazard, and instead focus only on the most 
mundane, yet unavoidable processing costs of the shoe leather type. Since Baumol 
(1952), Tobin (1956) and Orr and Mellon (1961), who analyze the trade off between 
holding cash and financial assets in the presence of shoe leather costs, these simplest 
of transaction costs have been largely ignored in micro economic theory of banking.
4 
Exceptions are models of Diamond (1997) and Qian et al. (2004), who assume that 
agents face an exogenous risk of facing (prohibitive) transaction costs. They show, in 
                                                 
3 Azariadis (1981) first observed that OLG models can have cyclical equilibria. Bhattacharya, Fulghieri 
and Rovelli (1998) first mention the cyclicality in the OLG Diamond Dybvig economy. 
4 Macro economists do acknowledge the importance of shoe leather costs. Lucas (2000) for instance 
argues that the excessive shoe leather costs brought on by inflation may account for as much as 1% of 
GNP when moving to the Friedman optimum.   4 
a stationary and in an OLG model respectively, that this transaction cost risk gives 
intermediaries an advantage over pure exchange mechanisms. 
Papers that study the effect of transaction costs on mutual funds include Cherkes et al. 
(2008),  who  examine  how  closed  end  funds  can  save  on  transaction  costs.  Their 
analysis shows that retail investors find funds attractive, even at prices above net asset 
value, because they offer them lower round trip transaction costs than home made 
portfolios of illiquid stocks. Chordia (1996) investigates the case for open end funds, 
and  shows  that,  apart  from  achieving  economies  of  scale  in  transaction  costs  and 
improving  on  diversification,  mutual  funds  provide  transaction  cost  sharing.
5  We 
show that funds can avoid transaction costs altogether. In our model economy (in 
which there is no aggregate risk), an open end fund will never sell secondary assets. 
Because intermediaries have large diversified clienteles of overlapping generations, 
total redemptions will exactly be paid from dividend income. 
In  the  pure  exchange  equilibrium  on  the  other  hand,  agents  will  rebalance  their 
portfolio  continuously,  moving  to  shorter  term  securities  as  they  grow  older.  We 
argue  that  a  prime  role  of  intermediaries  is  the  cancelling  out  of  such  life  cycle 
rebalancing. 
Our model also shows that, in the absence of aggregate risk, transaction costs lead to a 
downward sloping yield curve. The reason for this is that equilibrium investments in 
long  term  securities  come  with  lower  per  period  transaction  costs.  In  a  general 
equilibrium  model  Vayanos  (1998)  describes  this  effect  for  an  economy  with 
transaction costs and aggregate risk. He shows that illiquid stocks may trade at higher 
yields, because they internalize lower expected transaction costs.
6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the basic model is presented in the next 
section. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium in an unbounded pure exchange economy, 
while  section  4  investigates  how  a  competitive  bank  can  improve  on  the  above 
allocation. Section 5 juxtaposes the exchange and bank equilibrium in an economy 
                                                 
5 Funds can effectively enforce an ex ante desirable allocation of transaction costs: early consumers 
end up paying less and late consumers paying more. Van Bommel (2008) makes a similar argument for 
a Diamond Dybvig bank. 
6 Other papers that study the effect of transaction costs on asset prices are Constantinides (1986), 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Vayanos and Vila (1999), and Huang (2003).   5 
with a starting date and a first generation. We discuss several possible extensions to 
our  model  in  section  6,  and  summarize  our  findings  in  section  7.  The  appendix 
contains the proofs, an analysis of the model with variable transaction costs, and an 
analysis of the bank’s start up phase. 
2. The model 
We analyze an infinite horizon, single consumption good economy, where time is 
represented by the unbounded set of integers, representing the dates t on which agents 
interact. Henceforth we refer to periods between two dates as years. On every date, a 
continuum of agents is born on a circle with radius one, where they live throughout 
their lives. Agents are born with an endowment of one unit of consumption good and 
live either one year, with probability λ, or two years, and consume only on the date 
they die. All agents have expected utility preferences, modelled by an instantaneous 





1 ) ( C C U . Agents born at 
date t learn their type after t but before t+1. Types are not verifiable. We assume that 
the  population  is  large  enough  so  that  there  is  no  uncertainty  on  the  aggregate 
distribution of agents in the population.
7 
The economy is endowed with two technologies to produce goods over time. The first 
technology, storage, allows agents to costlessly transfer consumption from one period 
to the next, at the same location. The second, long term, technology allows agents to 
convert one unit of consumption at date t into R > 1 units of consumption at t + 2. 
This technology, which cannot be interrupted at t + 1, is located in the midpoint of the 
circle where it is operated by a firm which issues, inelastically, two year bonds with 
face value R payable at the midpoint for a price of unity. 
Naturally, agents can buy 2 year bonds and share liquidity risk by trading secondary 
claims. To do this, agents travel to a centrally located market, where they exchange 
one year bonds for consumption goods. The price for such bonds, denoted pt, is set by 
a Walrasian auctioneer to whom buyers and sellers submit their demand and supply 
                                                 
7 A continuum of newborns of size one, λ impatient one year olds, (1 λ) patient one year olds, and  
(1 λ) two year olds. The certain aggregate distribution of types, which is common in this literature, is 
usually justified in terms of the law of large numbers. Duffie and Sun (2007) provide a model of 
independent random matching that makes the law of large numbers hold exactly.   6 
curves. We abstract away from moral hazard so that buying (selling) bonds equates to 
riskless lending (borrowing).   
Agents may also form a financial intermediary. In this case, agents set up a bank 
where they deposit their endowments and receive a demandable debt security that 
entitles the holder to withdraw r1 after one year or r2 after two years. We shall assume 
throughout this article that exchanges and banks make zero profit. 
The  cost  of  travel,  denoted  c,  is  the  distinguishing  feature  of  our  model.  For 
tractability we assume this cost to be independent of the value of claims or goods 
transported. The fixed cost assumption produces an exchange equilibrium in which 
newborns employ mixed strategies and hold portfolios that consist either of only two 
year  bonds,  or  of  only  one year  bonds.  In  the  appendix  we  show  that  a  variable 
transaction cost leads to qualitatively the same insights as the fixed cost model. We 
further assume, without loss of generality, that the transaction cost is levied on the 
way back home. 
In the following we will characterize the equilibrium allocations, denoted {C1,C2}, in 
the exchange and bank economies. Naturally, we will compare agents’ ex-ante utility 
in both economies. 
3. The exchange economy 
In a pure exchange economy, newborns and patient one year olds can store or buy 
one  or two year bonds. To save space we shall limit our attention to the case where 
transaction costs are low enough for storage to be always dominated by investing. 
Because there is no uncertainty,  and transaction costs are fixed, newborns choose 
between two strategies: they either spend their entire endowment on buying two year 
bonds, which they will sell if they become impatient, or they buy only one year bonds 
and roll over these bonds if they remain patient. We denote these strategies LT and ST 
respectively. Notice that in the LT strategy all agents travel twice, while in the ST 
strategy, patient agents travel three times. 
Clearly, in equilibrium we need both types of agents. This implies that agents employ 
mixed strategies. In equilibrium, agents must be indifferent between both strategies. 
Hence, we need that:   7 
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The first bracketed term denotes the consumption of an agent who employs the LT 
strategy and becomes impatient: when born she buys 1 c two year bonds and sells 
them at her first birthday for pt+1. The fourth bracketed term is the consumption of an 
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patient, she reinvests the proceeds (net of transaction costs) in one year bonds. One 
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Notice that we do not consider the case where newborns buy one year bonds, and then 
roll them over into two year bonds when they stay patient. We will show that this 
strategy is strictly dominated by playing LT or ST. 
It can be easily verified that there is a unique stationary price process, 
* *
t p p =  that 
solves (1) for all t. With this
* p , we can derive the equilibrium probability 
* θ  with 
which newborns play LT from the following market clearing condition: 
























p       (2) 
In  expression  (2)  the  numerator  is  the  equilibrium  supply  of  goods,  and  the 
denominator the equilibrium supply of bonds. The following proposition gives the 
solution  for  the  unique  full  investment  equilibrium  in  the  unbounded  market 
economy.  
Proposition 1 (market equilibrium) 
For  low  enough  c,  there  exists  a  unique  stationary  market  equilibrium  with  fully 
invested agents (no storage). For the equilibrium price we have:  
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            (3)   8 
Newborn agents spend their entire endowment on two year bonds with probability θ
*, 
and invest all in one-year bonds otherwise. The equilibrium periodic investment in 
two year bonds is given by: 
  θ
* =  ( )
( ) ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
+ − λ − + + λ −
+ − λ − + −
p R c R p p c
p R c R p c
        (4) 
A closed form solution for 
* p  can only be found for certain values for γ. For brevity 
and relevance we focus on the interval in which 
* p  lies. This interval, given by (3),  
follows  from  equation  (1).  The  upper  bound  for 
* p ,  R ,  makes  the LT  strategy 
dominant: with  R p =
*  impatient consumption is independent of the strategy played, 
while patient consumption is higher under the LT strategy (see (1)). Similarly, if 
* p  = 
2 2 4 (1 )
2(1 )
c R c c
c
+ − −
− , the ST strategy would dominate. The expression for θ
* follows 
from rearranging equation (2). 
The key point is that 
* p R < , which implies that the return on a one year bond is 
higher than the one year return on a two year bond. This also is the reason why one 
year old patient agents do not buy two year bonds. Since their holding period is one 
year with certainty, patient one year olds will opt for one year bonds. 
Notice that proposition 1 limits itself to the full investment case. We shall later see 
that  if  c  is  zero  or  is  higher  than  a  threshold,  multiple  cyclical  equilibria  exist. 
Moreover, if the economy has a starting date (and hence a unique equilibrium), the 
economy may be by stuck in severe cyclicality. In section 5 we shall show that for a 
wide range of parameter values, the presence of transaction costs in a pure exchange 
economy with a starting date may enable convergence to the one periodic equilibrium 
characterized  in  proposition  1  and  hence  improve  overall  welfare  vis à vis  the 
transaction  cost  free  economy.  But  before  considering  the  truncated  economy,  we 
shall  first  investigate  how  a  financial  intermediary  can  improve  on  the  market 
allocation.   9 
4.  The intermediated economy 
We now consider how financial intermediaries can improve on the market allocation. 
Following the literature, we consider the simplest of intermediaries: infinitely lived 
deposit institutions whose only source of capital are deposits. In section 5 we consider 
how such intermediaries emerge in an economy with a starting date. In a stationary 
economy the intermediaries issue demandable debt securities that give depositors the 
right to withdraw, per unit of consumption good deposited, either r1 after one year, or 
r2 after two years. Naturally, the former payout is earmarked for the impatient agents, 
and the latter for the patient types. If we denote y the bank’s periodic investment in 
the production technology, we can write its objective function as follows:  
  ( ) ( ) 1 2
1 2
max  (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) , U c r c U c r c r r λ − − + −λ − −   (5) 
     subject to:        1 2 λ (1 λ) 1 r r y yR + − + ≤ +   (6) 
  1 r R ≤   (7) 
     2 r R ≤        (8) 
Equation (6) gives the bank’s budget constraint, while equations (7) and (8) are no-
arbitrage  conditions,  which  need  to  hold  to  avoid  that  competing  banks  open  up 
immediately  next  to  the  incumbent  and  invest  with  their  neighbors  instead  of 
investing in the production technology.
8 Naturally, (7) and (8) will bind so that we 
immediately have: 
Proposition 2 (bank economy) 
If c is sufficiently small, there exists a bank equilibrium in which banks offer, per unit 
of good deposited, r1 = R  one year after deposit, or r2 =R  after two years, at the 
option of the depositor. The periodic investment is given by: 
   






λ + −λ −
= −
−
            (9) 
                                                 
8 The no arbitrage condition is due to Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996). Qi (1994) showed that if this 
condition does not hold, banks can improve on the market allocation by building an asset buffer that 
benefits all generations.   10 
and all agents consume { } (1 ) , (1 ) c R c c R c − − − − . 
We have essentially the same bank as suggested by Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996), 
who show that in an economy without government intervention, the threat of arbitrage 
destroys the bank’s superior risk sharing ability and that the best schedule it can offer 
its clients is the market allocation. However, because in our model the payouts are 
offered at the central location, and agents incur shoe leather costs, the bank offers the 
agents a better allocation than the exchange mechanism:  
Corollary (banks versus markets) 
For positive transaction cost c, the bank allocation is Pareto superior to the one-
periodic exchange allocation. 
Proof:  Agents  who  choose  the  LT  strategy  in  the  market  economy  receive  an 
consumption  schedule  { }
* (1 ) , (1 ) c p c c R c − − − − ,  whereas  bank  depositors  consume 
{ } (1 ) , (1 ) c R c c R c − − − − . The bank allocation is superior because 
* p R < .      Q.E.D. 
The reason for the superiority of banks lies of course in the difference in total travel. 
In the market economy, the total number of trips to the midpoint of the circle is 
2+θ(1 λ)  per  generation,  while  in  the  bank  equilibrium  only  two  trips  are  made. 
Interestingly, it is the impatient agents who bear these transaction costs. Patient agents 
are equally well off in both economies. 
Notice that the equilibrium allocation in the bank economy avoids roll over arbitrage 
(Qi, 1994): a patient agent who withdraws and redeposits reaps  ( ) (1 ) c R c R c − − − , 
clearly less than her consumption when she would hold on to her deposit. Similarly, 
side trading á la Jacklin (1987) is dominated. A newborn who buys two year bonds 
and offers them for sale to patient bank depositors in case she becomes impatient,   11 







  per  bond,  and  hence  consumes  at  most  (1 ) 2 c R c − −   < 
c p c − −
* ) 1 (  if she becomes impatient, and (1 ) c R c − −  if she remains patient.
9 
5. Starting up the economy 
Now that we have shown that in the unbounded OLG economy banks offer agents a 
higher expected utility, a natural question to ask is how the economy develops when 
there is a starting date and a first generation. 
5.1. The exchange economy 
Because in a hypothetical first year, there are no one year bonds for sale, agents of the 
first generation will either store their entire endowment or play LT. In equilibrium 
they need to be indifferent so that we have: 
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               (10) 
Clearly there exists a unique p1 which solves this equality. We shall denote it 
*
1 p . 
Similarly,  the  second  and  consecutive  generations  need  to  be  indifferent  between 
playing LT and either storing or playing ST:   
  ( )      [ ]  max [ ]  , [ ] LT ST Store EU EU EU =                      (11) 
Where E[U]LT and E[U]ST are defined in (1) and E[U]Store is the same as in the second 
line of (10) but with pt instead of p1. Clearly, also to (11) a unique solution exists. 
Since we have 
*
1 p , we can find 
* * * *
1 2 3 { , , ,...} p p p ≡ p  by recursively solving (11). 
It can be easily seen from (10) that the first market price is smaller than the stationary 
price: 
* *
1 p p < . Because on the second date of a bounded economy one year bonds are 
relatively cheap, the second generation prefers playing ST over storing. The equation 
which solves (11) for the second generation then gives 
* *
2 p p > , which implies that the 
                                                 
9 The reservation price for the bond makes patient depositors indifferent between early withdrawing 
and purchasing bonds and sticking to their deposit. The consumption of a depositor who withdraws and 




− , while his reservation consumption is (1 ) c R c − − .   12 
third  generation  may  prefer  storing  over  buying  one year  bonds.  If  it  does,  the 
relevant equation to find 
*
3 p  is equal to (10), with p3 instead of p1. This means that if 
the third generation stores, all consecutive odd generations will, and we have a two 
periodic equilibrium without full investment. If, however, the third generation does 
not store, and divides itself ST and LT players, then all consecutive odd generations 
will have ST players and the price will two periodically converge to the stationary 
level, 
* p . 
We therefore have that  in a bounded  economy, one of three types of  equilibrium 
obtains:  (i)  autarky,  in  which  case  the  first  generation,  and  hence  consecutive 
generations,  do  not  interact  and  recur  to  storing  only,  (ii)  a  perpetually  cyclical 
equilibrium  in  which  the  first  and  consecutive  odd  generations  store,  and  (iii)  a 
cyclical  start up  that  converges  to  the  steady  state  equilibrium  characterized  in 
proposition 1. 
To gain insight into the different types of equilibrium, we compute the equilibria for 
different  parameter  values.  Figure  1  shows  how,  for  λ  =  ½  and  γ  =  2½,  the 
equilibrium type depends on parameters c and R. Not surprisingly, for low values of R 
and high transaction costs c, it is more difficult to start up the economy. 
We also see that there exists a wedge shaped region where a full investment exchange 
equilibrium exists in the unbounded economy, but the economy with a starting date is 
stuck in autarky. Naturally, this is due to the fact that the first generation that invests 
faces more payoff risk than a stationary generation. It is not surprising then that the 
size of the wedge increases in γ. 
There is also a region where a bounded exchange economy gets stuck in cyclicality. 
We find that the size of this triangular region sharply decreases in γ. For λ = ½, 
convergence always obtains for γ > 3, while for γ < 2 convergence only obtains for 
very  high  values  of  R.  Risk  aversion  thus  helps  an  economy  to  converge  to 
stationarity. The reason is that the risk averse agents of the first generation store more, 
which helps to increase 
*
1 p , (and decrease 
*
2 p , etc.) 
Finally, there is a parameter region where the bounded economy is better off with 
transaction costs than without. Above the dashed line in figure 1, the presence of a 
transaction costs enables the exchange economy to converge to a one periodic price   13 
* p , while in the absence of transaction costs, the price process would be two periodic 
{..,1,R,1,R,…}. Although total intergenerational consumption in the economy  with 
transaction costs is lower, and the second and consecutive even start up generations 
enjoy lower utility than in the transaction cost free economy, the reduced cyclicality 
causes long run welfare to be higher. Naturally, the region where the economy is 
better off with transaction costs increases in risk aversion parameter γ. 
Figure  2  illustrates  the  convergence  process  for  an  economy  with  λ  =  ½,  R  =  2,  
c = 0.10, and γ = 4. Not surprisingly, the speed to convergence increases in γ. To 
illustrate convergence we chose γ = 4 because for lower values of γ, convergence is 
significantly slower, so that either the convergence shape, or the zigzag pattern would 
be difficult to depict in a graph. 
5.2. The intermediated economy 
In section 4 we saw that in the stationary bank equilibrium, impatient one year olds 
are paid partly from the proceeds of investments made one year before they were 
born. In the bounded economy, the first generation’s impatient agents can only be 
paid from the deposits made by the second generation, which limits the amount of risk 
sharing. To reach the stationary level, the bank needs to build up a buffer during a 
start  up  phase.  Qi  (1994)  and  Bhattacharya  et  al.  (1998)  show  that  this  can  be 
achieved by ‘holding out’ early generations. A bank in the start up phase will invest as 
much as possible in the technology while offering early agents the utility they would 
obtain if they would be ostracized. To minimize the payouts in early periods, the bank 
sets r1 as high as possible, and is constrained only by the rollover constraint r1
2 ≥ r2. 
To meet its r1 obligation on early dates, the bank may need to store. Appendix C gives 
the precise maximization problem of the bank in an economy with a starting date. 
We find that for most parameter values, the bank can be started up within a single 
period, which means that it can already offer the second generation the stationary 
schedule  } , { R R . Not surprisingly, the length of the start up phase decreases in the 
R/c ratio. 
We also find that whenever a bank equilibrium exists, it can be started up. This is 
because there is no cyclicality in an intermediated economy, and the bank’s allocation 
is superior to the market allocation due to transaction costs.   14 
Figure 3 gives the number of start up periods as a function of R and c, if λ = ½ and 
γ = 2½. For comparison, the equilibrium regions in the exchange economy (see figure 
1) are displayed in gray. As can be seen from the figure, there is a narrow parameter 
region  for  which  there  would  be  no  trade  in  the  market  economy,  but  a  bank 
equilibrium exists (and can be started up). Appendix C gives an illustration of such a 
bank. 
6. Discussion 
In the previous sections we characterized equilibrium allocations in simple models of 
pure exchange and intermediated economies, and showed that intermediaries can save 
on  transaction  costs  by  servicing  a  large  diversified  clientele  of  agents  who  face 
uncorrelated  liquidity  shocks  and  fixed  transaction  costs.  In  the  following  we 
conjecture  that  the  key  insights  of  our  model  continue  to  hold  in  more  realistic 
models. 
Under our first simplifying assumption agents can only become impatient on a single 
intermediary date. It is easy to see that if we assume more impatience dates before the 
technology  pays  off,  our  results  would  be  stronger.  This  is  because  with  more 
impatience dates, more rebalancing would take place in exchange economy. If there 
exists  a  continuum  of  potential  impatience  dates,  agents  continuously  rebalance, 
slanting their portfolio to ever more short term securities as they get older (Vayanos, 
1998; Vayanos and Vila, 1999). By catering to a continuum of agents, banks, mutual 
funds,  pension  plans  or  insurance  companies  do  not need  to  rebalance  their  asset 
portfolios, as long as they continuously rebalance their clientele of depositors and 
investors. 
A second unrealistic assumption concerns the gestation period, which we assumed to 
equal  the  maximum  life  span  of  the  agents.  Also  this  assumption  can  be  altered 
without affecting the key insights of our model. Similarly, the presence of multiple 
production technologies, of different gestation lags, would not change the key insights 
of our analysis. It can be shown that in the pure exchange economy long term projects 
attract investment, and at least one production technology has a gestation lag longer 
than  the  minimum  time  until  potential  impatience,  agents  will  rebalance  their 
portfolios to shorter duration securities as they get older, and hence incur avoidable 
transaction costs.   15 
This will also be the case if the long term assets are infinitely lived, as equities are. In 
this  case,  surviving  agents  in  the  exchange  economy  will,  over  their  life  cycle, 
rebalance  their  portfolio  from  predominately  low  dividend  yield  to  high  dividend 
yield stocks. Our model formalizes this intuition, and shows that, in the presence of 
transaction costs, agents align consumption duration with portfolio duration, because 
long term securities fetch lower prices on intermediary dates.
10 
A  third  simplifying  assumption  in  our  model  is  that  of  no  payoff  risk.  A  natural 
extension to our model is to consider a long term technology that offers a stochastic 
dividend. It can be shown that also in such a model newborn agents will buy a mix of 
long and short term securities and rebalance their portfolios over their life.
11 In the 
intermediated economy on the other hand, mutual funds will offer their investors state 
dependent redemption schedules (based on net asset values), that ex-ante offer them 
higher expected utility than the market economy due to the avoidance of excessive 
dividend reinvestment and maturity rebalancing. 
Finally, we assumed that agents’ liquidity shocks are independent, and that there is no 
aggregate liquidity risk. However, it can be shown that our results continue to hold if 
agents’ liquidity shocks are less than perfectly correlated, and aggregate risk exists. In 
this case, banks will hold cash buffers alongside a portfolio of long term and short 
term assets. The optimal cash buffer depends mostly on the covariances of depositors’ 
liquidity shocks. Edgeworth (1888) first discussed the bank’s cash inventory problem 
in the presence of stochastic net withdrawals. 
Also for mutual funds,  redemptions and  contributions are unlikely to be perfectly 
correlated, so that they too hold cash. A cash buffer reduces the need to engage in 
uninformed but costly liquidity trades but also reduces the fund’s expected return. Not 
surprisingly, the optimal cash balance is an interior optimum, so that mutual funds 
engage  in  significant  liquidity  trade  on  their  shareholders  behalf.  Edelen  (1999) 
                                                 
10  This  intuition  was  first  described  in  (Thaler  and  Shefrin,  1981),  who  attributed  the  observed 
consumption/cashflow duration matching to self control. Notice that in our model intermediaries do not 
have a comparative advantage in life cycle rebalancing driven by tax reasons (Miller, 1977) or risk 
preferences. Clearly, the suggested generational diversification is incompatible with age dependent tax  
or risk preferences. In any case, whether life cycle risk rebalancing is optimal is still an open question. 
See Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) among others.  
11 Maturity rebalancing in the face of liquidity risk is studied by Eisfeldt (2007).   16 
estimates the associated costs of liquidity driven trades for mutual funds to be 1.5 – 
2% per annum. Chordia (1996) argues that to reduce forced liquidity trades triggered 
by  shareholder  redemptions,  funds  charge  upfront  fees,  called  loads.  Yan  (2006) 
develops a model to solve a mutual fund’s cash inventory problem, and finds evidence 
that fund cash holdings are determined by a trade off between expected variance of 
the flow (contributions minus redemptions) and transaction costs in the asset markets. 
In our model we assume away aggregate risk so as to best illustrate the main trust of 
this  paper,  which  is  that  through  intergenerational  pooling  of  shareholders  and 
depositors, intermediaries are able to cancel rebalancing transaction that would occur 
in the free market. Correlated liquidity shocks and aggregate flow risk obfuscate this 
advantage but do not eliminate it. 
7. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we formalize the widely held intuition that the comparative advantage of 
financial intermediaries lies in their ability to internalize transaction costs by holding 
buffers of assets with different durations. 
Our model demonstrates that centrally located intergenerational banks can economize 
on  transaction  costs  that  would  otherwise  be  incurred  due  to  life  cycle  duration 
rebalancing. In a simple model with spatial separation and shoe leather costs in which 
agents face consumption risk, excessive trade obtains in the pure exchange economy 
because  equilibrium  prescribes  late  dying  agents  to  reinvest  dividends  and  incur 
avoidable transaction costs. We show that an intermediary that offers demand deposits 
can internalize the rebalancing trades, and improve welfare.   
Naturally,  our  shoe  leather  cost  aims  to  capture  the  plethora  of  other  types  of 
transaction processing costs, such as communication, search, administration, and even 
paying  attention.  It  is  by  netting  out  these  tasks  that  financial  intermediaries  add 
value,  while  offering  their  clients  immediacy.  Our  financial  intermediary  can  be 
interpreted as a bank with automatic teller machines, insurance companies, or an open 
end mutual fund.   17 
Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of proposition 1 
We first show that there exists a unique one periodic equilibrium. Substituting p for pt 
and pt+1 in equation (1) and rewriting gives: 
  ( ) ( )
2
2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 R R R U c p c U c c U c R c U c c c p p p
        λ − − − − − + −λ − − − − − − =                
        (A1) 
Differentiating  shows  that  the  lhs  of  (A1)  is  continuously  increasing  in  p  for  all 
relevant parameter values. The derivative of the first term is positive. The derivative 
of the second term of (A1) is: 
     
2 2
3 2 2
(1 ) (1 ) 2 ' (1 ) c R cR R R U c c c p p p p
    − −λ − − − −    
   
             (A2) 
which is positive unless 2(1 ) c R p c
− > . The latter inequality cannot hold in equilibrium 
because if it would, nobody would buy one year bonds. 
Also, the lhs of (A1) is positive if p R = and negative for  
2 2 4 (1 )
2(1 )
c R c c
p c
+ − −
= − . 
This proves that there is a unique one periodic equilibrium, and that it lies between 
abovementioned values. 
 
We still need to prove that no two periodic equilibrium exists. A potential two 
periodic equilibrium solves the following system of equations: 
( ) ( )
2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 j
i i j j
R R R U c p c U c c U c R c U c c c p p p p
        λ − − − − − + −λ − − − − − − =                
 (A3) 
And  
( ) ( )
2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 i
j j i i
R R R U c p c U c c U c R c U c c c p p p p
       
λ − − − − − + −λ − − − − − − =        
       
 (A4) 
Assume pi > p
*, then clearly, from both (A3) and (A4), we must have pj < p
*.  
Consider the lhs’s of (A3) and (A4) functions of pj, for given pi > p
*. The functions 
cross at  pi, and increase continuously. The derivatives are: 
    ( )
2 2
2 2
(A3) (1 ) (1 ) ' (1 ) (1 ) ' (1 ) j
j i j j i j j
lhs c R R R R cU c p c c U c c c p p p p p p p
    ∂ − =λ − − − + −λ − − − −     ∂    
      (A5)   18 
           
2 2
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lhs c R c R R R R U c c U c c c p p p p p p p p
    ∂ − − =λ − − + −λ − − −     ∂    
       (A6) 
Clearly 
* (A4) (A3)  j
j j
lhs lhs p p p p
∂ ∂ > ∀ < ∂ ∂ , which proves that for any pi > p
*, no pj exists 
that simultaneously satisfies equations (A3) and (A4). 
The periodic investment θ
* =  ( )
( ) ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
+ − λ − + + λ −
+ − λ − + −
p R c R p p c
p R c R p c
, follows from 
rewriting the market clearing condition (2). 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The optimal bank allocation follows immediately from solving (5) subject to (7) and 
(8). The expression for the periodic investment, 










from rewriting (6). 
Appendix B: Variable Transaction Costs 
We  now  investigate  the  exchange  economy  equilibrium  in  the  case  of  variable 
transaction costs. In this case the transaction costs are cV, where V is the value of the 
goods transported to the circle’s midpoint, at the midpoint. This means that newborns 
can spend (1 c) on either one year or two year bonds, and a patient agent who sells x 




−  on buying new bonds. In such an economy, 
newborns will buy both types of bonds. If they become impatient they sell the two 
year bonds before they mature (as one year bonds), and if they stay patient they roll 
over  the  one year  bonds.  Denote  yt  the  amount  that  newborns  invest  in  two  year 
bonds. Their objective function is then: 
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       (B1) 
The first order condition of this maximization problem is: 
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                       (B2)   19 
In a one periodic stationary equilibrium both (B2) with pt = pt+1 = p
* and yt = y
* must 






(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) R y c y c c
p p
y
− − + −λ − − −
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λ
                 (B3) 
A unique solution exists to these two equations. This can be seen by rewriting (B3): 
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                               (B4) 
Substituting this in (B2), and rewriting gives: 
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*
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p p R c
+ −
= −
λ+ + −λ −
                          (B7) 
It can be shown that for 
* p R = , the rhs of (B5) is positive (and clearly the lhs is 
zero). As we let 
* p  decrease, the rhs decreases,  while the lhs increases so that a 
unique 
* p   exists  that  solves  (B2)  and  (B3).  This  proves  that  also  with  variable 
transactions costs, and pure strategies, a unique noncyclical market equilibrium exists. 
Because the derivation is slightly more complicated and less intuitive, we opted for 
modelling the transaction costs be fixed. 
Appendix C: Starting up the bank 
First  we  observe  that  to  minimize  the  time  to  stationarity,  banks  will  maximize 
investment in the long term asset in early years, until the stationary investment y
* is 
reached. In the following denote yt the bank’s investment at t, st the investment in the 
storage technology and  } , { 2 1
t t r r  the payoffs distributed on date t. Let T be the time 
when  1
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
*
−
− λ − + λ − = = R
R R c y yt . Clearly at T, the bank can offer a schedule   20 
} , { R R  per deposited unit of consumption good. The maximization problem during 
the start up phase is then:  
   
T t
t t r r .. 1 2 1 } , {
min
=
 T                               (C1) 
Subject to:   0
1
2 0 0 = = = r s y                              (C2) 
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t t t r r r   ∀ t > 0                                (C5) 
This  maximization  problem  can  be  solved  by  letting  the  budget  constraint  (C3), 
participation constraint (C4) and roll over constraint (C5) bind until T. 
Table 1 illustrates the start up phase of such a bank in an economy where an exchange 
will not open: If R = 1.33, γ = 2.5 and c = 0.10. To see that an exchange equilibrium 
does not exist, solve (1) with the above parameter values. The solution gives p
* = 
1.1348. If we now compute the agents’ expected utility in with this p
*, we find it to be 
less than U(1), the expected utility in autarky.
12 Table 1 shows that in a world with  
the above parameter values a bank equilibrium does exist, and can be started up in 
five years. 




3 ( ) U C C
− =− , we find E[U]LT = E[U]ST =  0.6709, while U(1) =  0.6667.    21 
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Figure 1: Equilibria in a Bounded Exchange Economy 
We  compute  the  equilibrium  price  prices  in  a  bounded  OLG  Diamond  Dybvig 
economy with λ = ½  and where agents have utility functions given by 
3
2 2
3 ( ) U C C
− =−  
(CRRA parameter γ = 2.5), for varying fixed transaction costs c, and asset payoffs R. 
The areas between the black lines give the equilibrium type. Above the gray line a 
one periodic stationary  equilibrium exists in the unbounded  economy.  The dashed 
gray line denotes the area where overall welfare is higher in the bounded exchange 














Overall wellfare higher 
with transaction costs  25 
Figure 2: Market Equilibrium Start-up in a Bounded Economy 
We compute the equilibrium prices in a bounded OLG Diamond Dybvig economy 
with transaction costs with λ = ½ , R = 2, c = 0.10, and agents’ utility function is 
given by 
3 1
3 ( ) U C C
− =−  (CRRA parameter γ = 4). The graph gives the equilibrium 
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Figure 3: Start-up Bank Equilibria in a Bounded Economy 
We compute the bank allocations in a bounded OLG Diamond Dybvig economy with 
λ = ½ , R = 2, c = 0.10, and agents’ utility function is given by 
3
2 2
3 ( ) U C C
− =−  (CRRA 
parameter γ = 2.5), for varying c and R. The areas between the black lines give the 
minimum  number  of  periods  it  takes  to  start  up  the  stationary  bank  equilibrium. 
Below the bottom black line, no bank equilibrium exists. In the region immediately 
above this line the bank’s start up phase is at least three periods. In the background 










one start up period
two start up periods
three start up periods
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Table 1: Example of a Bank Start-up 
For an economy with λ = ½, R = 1.33, γ = 2.5 and c = 0.10, we compute the payoff 
schedule for a competitive bank. To build an asset buffer it offers early generations 
their reservation utility, obtained in Autarky. The first two columns give the promised 
payoffs, per unit of consumption good deposited. The third last column equals the 
second column of the previous row multiplied by λ(1 c). The inflow from investment 
equals the amount stored in the previous period plus the amount invested two periods 
earlier multiplied by R.  









0 1.1462 1.3139  0.6667 0.9 0.9000 0.6256 0.2744 0.9000
1 1.1462 1.3139  0.6667 0.9 0.2744 1.1744 0.6313 0.0273 0.5158 1.1744
2 1.1462 1.3139  0.6667 0.9 0.8656 1.7656 0.6389 0.0197 0.5158 0.5912 1.7656
3 1.1462 1.3139  0.6667 0.9 0.8656 1.7656 0.6490 0.0095 0.5158 0.5912 1.7656
4 1.1553 1.3400  0.6525 0.9 0.8656 1.7656 0.6586 0.5158 0.5912 1.7656
5 1.1576 1.3400  0.6513 0.9 0.8697 1.7697 0.6586 0.5199 0.5912 1.7697
6 1.1576 1.3400  0.6513 0.9 0.8825 1.7825 0.6586 0.5209 0.6030 1.7825
7 1.1576 1.3400  0.6513 0.9 0.8825 1.7825 0.6586 0.5209 0.6030 1.7825
8 0.9 0.8825 1.7825 0.6586 0.5209 0.6030 1.7825
Goods Inflow Goods Outflow
 
 
 
 